Third Intermediate Chapter
Secret of Nitya-Anitya- Just as dravya is self established
by nature, in the same way it manifests by self. Hence with the self
established nature it is Nitya and with
manifesting nature it is Anitya . In this way the Tattva is Nitya-Anitya form.
Nitya is trikaal stationary which is called as Samanya- Dravya-Tattva-Vastu
-Sattva etc. Anitya has duration of one samaya. It is also known as
Vishesh-Parinam- Paryaya-Avastha. In this way the Samanya-Vishesh nature of
substance is same in some aspect and different in some other aspect like lamp
flame, ocean waves, mud pot.
Description of Nitya Anitya
pair
Doubt
336. Shloka –Whether entity is (1) Nitya , (2)
Anitya, (3)both , (4) Anubhaya, (5) Vyasta, (6) Samasta, (7) Kramavarty , (8)
Akramavarty ?
Answer 337-340
337. Shloka- If the word absolute be applied
before those words then the entity is destructive of both self and others. If
the term ‘Syat’ be applied before them then the same entity assumes all the
forms and serves self and others both.
Bhavartha- Just as entity is self established, it is by itself
manifesting natured also. Hence in description one dharma becomes primary and
other becomes secondary. In this consideration of primary-secondary only the
entity is sometimes called some form and
sometimes another form. However, abandoning the consideration of
primary-secondary by accepting the entity to be absolutely one dharma(ekant)
form only, any substance does not get established. Hence by calling absolute it
is destructive and by describing it in certain aspect it establishes all as
follows- (1) from aspect of swabhava the entity is Nitya (2) From aspect of
Parinam entity is Anitya (3) From aspect of Praman entity is both i.e.
Nitya-Anitya (4) From aspect of indivisibility entity is Anubhava i.e. neither
Nitya nor Anitya, indescribable, Indivisible (5) swabhava remains for Trikaal
and Parinam remains for one samaya only hence entity is Vyasta – separate (6)
the one which is Swbhava form , the same is Parinam form, from this aspecy
entity is Samasta (together) (7) Parinam are generated Kramabaddha hence it is
Kramavarty, (8) swabhava is always one form from this aspect it is Akramavarty
. In summary with application of term Syat all are right. With application of
absolute even one is not right.
Elaboration of above
338. Shloka- Just as entity is self established,
in the same way it is by itself manifesting by nature. In this way the entity
has two natures of being Nitya as well as Anitya.
Bhavartha- It remains for ever without giving up its nature , from this
aspect it is Nitya also, and keeps manifesting at every moment, i.e. changes
from one state to next, from this aspect it is Anitya also. In this way the
entity has two natures.
339. Shloka- The implication is that when Drishti
is kept upon the substance and not upon
manifestation then from aspect of Dravyarthika naya, the substance is Nitya
since the substance Samanya is never destroyed.
340. Shloka- And
when the Drishti is not upon the substance but upon manifestation alone
then from aspect of Paryayarthika naya the substance is Anitya since at every
moment the new paryaya is generated and old paryaya is destroyed.
Several Objections
pertaining to entity and manifestation
341. Shloka- Just as entity is one, the
manifestation is also one , thus they are two. What is the reason that of the
two only one can be described in order and not both together?
Whether both are like sound
of two letters sequentially ?
342. Shloka- Is it that just as letters B and C
etc. exist equally but in speech they are spoken sequentially , in the same way
the entity and manifestation are spoken sequentially although existent
together?
Are they Like Vindhyachal
and Himachal ?
343. Shloka- Or is it that just as Vindhyachal and
Himachal are two independent entities in viewing but depending upon the wishes
of the speaker the one under consideration becomes primary and other becomes
secondary ? In the same way are the entity and manifestation are independent
two and of the two, the one which is under consideration becomes primary and
other becomes secondary ?
Are they like Lion and
Sadhu ?
344. Shloka- Or is it that just as a person
appears sometimes like lion and
sometimes like sadhu. In the same way the substance sometimes appears like existent and sometimes
appears like manifestation form. Do the substance has relationship of
adjective-substantive with existent and
manifestation ?
Are they like two names of
two horns of cow?
345. Shloka- Or is it like two names of the same
substance given two names with different
objectives like Agni and Vaishvanar, in the same way the same substance has two
names existent and manifestation with different objectives. Or, are they like the left and right horns of a cow ?
Are they like raw-ripe mud with difference of
time?
346. Shloka- Or with difference of time one occurs
first and then second? Just as raw and ripe mud occurs first and next, in the
same way the entity and manifestation are there?
Are they like two wives
347. Shloka- Just as two wives of a person married
earlier and later stay with opposition at the same kaal, in the same way the
entity and manifestation generated sequentially stay with opposite bhavas at
present kaal i.e. in spite of being generated
at different kaal they stay with opposition at the same kaal with equal rights.
Are they like two brothers
or two wrestlers
348. Shloka- Or like elder and younger brothers
they stay together with mutually non-opposite bhavas. Or are they like two
wrestlers who attaining victory and defeat over each other continuously get
destroyed in the end , in the same way the existence and manifestation with
mutual opposition gets destroyed in the end.
Are they like other and
non-other or are they like two directions
349. Shloka- Or between entity and
manifestation, the vyavahara is only in
formal sense like between two
people being called first and second. Or
is it like two directions east and west
in Vyavahara sense?
Bhavartha- Just as first second are only Vyavahara sense relative terms
or the east west are relative terms without any specific place being called as
east.
Are they like dual
predicates
350. Shloka- Do they have support-supported form relationship of two
predicates, like ‘water is in the pot’ but not other way round conversely.
Are they like seed and
sprout
351.Shloka- Or just as seed and sprout have cause
-effect bhava, in the same way the entity and manifestation have same bhava?
Are they like gold and
stone
352. Shloka- Or are they like gold and stone with one being desirable and
other being undesirable.
Are they like Vachya-Vachak
( thing & its name)
353. Shloka- Just as Vachya(thing) is different from Vachak (its name); is the
entity and manifestation different from the substance?
Are they like drum and
stick
354. Shloka- Without both the purpose is not served,
therefore entity and manifestation both need to be stated, just as with drum
and stick the objective is served. In the same way does the substance get
established with both entity and manifestation?
Are the terms like Poorna Nyaya
355.Shloka- As per term Poorna Nyaya with any of
the two terms entity and manifestation the purpose gets served hence the second
term is told in disinterested manner. One is adequate.
Are they like two friends
356. Shloka- Or one of them being Upadan cause
carried out the karya while the other as supporting reason strengthens the
carried out task. Are they like such two friends?
Are they like order
357. Shloka- Order is like enemy , are they like
that? Wherein one completely destroys other from roots and becoming independent
blossoms by itself.
Are they like two ropes
358. Shloka- Just as ropes held in left and right
hand remaining separate also carry out the necessary task , in the same way do
the entity and manifestation remaining opposite and disjoint carry out the
task.
Visheshartha- It has been told earlier that substance is entity and manifestation
dual form. However when anyone is under consideration then it appears in that
form since entity and manifestation are not totally different. However the
questioner, not being satisfied with this explanation, has posed several
objections with examples. The author refutes them in following shlokas-
Answers
359. Shloka- The questioner in support of his view
has quotes examples which are being destructive of both own and other sides,
hence they do not qualify as examples.
Which dim-witted person would attempt to destroy himself i.e. no one.
The example of letters in
respect of entity and manifestation is not valid
360. Shloka- Mutually relative both dharmas entity
and manifestation are subject of Praman. The example of letters which
eliminates the Praman is not valid.
Bhavartha- The letters are independent. The letters A, B, C, D etc are
not established with respect to each other but independently. But entity and
manifestation are mutually relative hence the example of letters is irregular.
Praman described two mutually relative dharmas and Praman cannot be eliminated
since the nature of substance is both dharma form. Hence existence of Praman is
compulsory.
In the absence of Praman,
naya also cannot remain
361. Shloka- Firstly the absence of Praman is not
established with any example, secondly in the absence of Praman, naya also
cannot defend itself. Without implication of sentence the words and predicates
do not serve any purpose.
Bhavartha- ‘Bring pot of ghee’. In this sentence if the words pot and
ghee alone are used then they do not convey any meaning in spite of predicates.
In the same way if Praman is not accepted whose subject is mutually relative
two dharmas, then the naya whose subject is one part of substance, cannot
survive. Since only in the presence of the knowledge of all the dharmas
substance the knowledge of one dharma each can exist.
362- 363. Shloka- In answer to the above if the doubt
is raised that if in accordance with Sanskar (ordination) if the meaning of the
sentence be derived from words itself i.e. the nayas itself may be accepted as
Praman? This gives rise to two flaws-
(1) Nayas would be eliminated since nayas have been accepted as Praman. (2)
When the meaning of sentence is conveyed by a letter or word then sequential
sound would not
be means for realisation of meaning.
Example of Vindhyachal and
Himachal is also delusional
364. Shloka- The example of Vindhyachal and
Himachal mountains also cannot establish the objective wherein one substance
one dharma is primary and other is secondary; since both are totally
independent.
Bhavartha- In reality the entity and manifestation are accepted to be
different in some aspect. But Himacahal and Vindhyachal are totally independent
and different. Then one cannot be primary and other secondary. Therefore this
example is not valid.
The example of lion and
sadhu is also delusional
365-366. Shloka- Just as lion or sadhu are adjectives
used for a man, in the same way the entity and manifestation are not adjectives
of substance. The example quoted has flaw of unestablished nature like telling
that water is scented.
Bhavartha- The substance has nature of being existent and manifesting.
It is not imaginary like lion and sadhu. Hence this example does not serve any
purpose.
The example of Agni and
Vaishvanar is also delusional (367-373)
367. Shloka-
Like agni
and Vaishvanar are names of fire, in the same way entity and manifestation are
two names of substance- such assertion does not establish the objective and the
example is flawed being devoid of objective.
368. shloka- Here two names are imagined. Whether
it is carried out neglecting both dharmas of substance or keeping them in mind?
By accepting the first side, in the absence of dharmas the dharmi also becomes
absent and further consideration is
useless.
369. Shloka- On accepting second side, then two
questions arise that whether both dharmas are different from dravya or are
indifferent. If they are accepted to be different then there is nothing new.
Just as earlier dharmas are absent in the same way dharmi is also absent. Hence
no purpose is served.
370. Shloka- If in spite of the two dharmas being
different, they are Yutasiddha hence there can be dharma-dharmi bhava. In such
a case all substances would have relation ship with all substances and all
substances would become all forms.
371. Shloka- If two dharmas are not different from
dravya, this sameness is like cloth and colour or dough and salt?
372. Shloka- If it is told that they are same as
dough and salt, then the saltiness of the chapati is due to salt only. Chapati
is different from salt. Same way the dharmas would be different from dravya.
Thus they are independent like the example of letters quoted earlier. Then
neither Praman gets established nor naya.
373. Shloka- If the sameness is like cloth and
colour then it supports our argument only. Just as colour does not exist
without cloth and cloth cannot exist without colour, in the same way the entity
and manifestation do not exist without each other. Then the argument of questioner
giving two names to same substance like agni and Vaishvanar is self defeating.
The example of left right
horns of cow is not valid (374-375)
374. Shloka- The example of left right horns of
cow is invalid since both horns are supported by the cow while entity and
manifestation do not have another substance to support them. Like lotus of the sky has good smell, this example
is invalid since sky does not support lotus.
375. Shloka- Other than entity and manifestation
there is no other substance. Just as lamp and light are indifferent and
intermingled, in the same way the entity and manifestation are together having
oneness. Hence this example is invalid.
Raw-Ripe Mud is also
delusional example (376-378)
376. Shloka- The raw and ripe mud cannot be
example since they occur sequentially hence this example damages both sides.
377. Shloka- The questioner has given this example which naturally supports
sequentiality while Jains accept both entity and manifestation together. The
other side has tried to establish them as two independent substances while they
are two sequential states. Hence it demolishes his side.
378. Shloka- The questioner wishes to establish
the substance either Nitya or Anitya. On the other hand the mud is accepted to
be Nitya from aspect of Samanya while from aspect of rawness it is Anitya.
Hence it does not support his stand.
Example of two wives is
also delusional (379-380)
379-380. Shloka- The example of two wives has three
types of flaws namely Viruddha, Anaikantik and Asiddha.
Telling some one that my mother is infertile is absolutely
Viruddha. In the same way believing entity and manifestation to be sequentially
produced like two wives and describing their existence in same kaal is
absolutely Viruddha. Since entity and manifestation are not produced
sequentially at some particular time nor they stay in same place with
opposition. Eternally their mutual joint existence continues. Hence this
example is Viruddha.
The two wives may live with opposition and some places they
may stay without opposition. It is not a rule that they stay in
opposition. Hence this example is
defective with Anaikantik anomaly.
The Siddhant of Bauddha that all substances are Anitya since
they are absolutely momentary is Asiddha since the substances are observed to
be Nitya also by recollection. Here the example of two wives is Asiddha since
they are two substances while entity and manifestation are one only. The wives
are opposite with time difference of presence. The entity and manifestation are
together at same time. Hence this is flawed with Asiddha Anomaly.
The example of Elder and
younger brother is also delusional
381-282- Shloka- Here also three anomalies exist.
Firstly the elder and younger brother are born in sequence but the entity and
manifestations are not produced in sequence. Both are together. Hence the
example suffers from Viruddha defect.
Secondly the two brother are produced by their parents but
the entity and manifestation do not have such support, they are independent.
Hence it gives rise to Ashraya Asiddha anomaly.
Thirdly the brothers are produced by parents who in turn were
produced by their parents and so on, In such case the entity and manifestations
are dependent continuously which is known as Anavastha anomaly.
The example of two
wrestlers is also delusional
383-384. Shloka- The two wrestlers are dependent upon
each other which is known as Itaretar anomaly. In the end both die hence
nothing gets established . Hence both entity and manifestation are eliminated
which is not right.
Example of two predicates
is also delusional
385-388. Shloka - The example of predicates dual is not
useful since it is applicable both for and against hence it is defective. Just
as for undifferentiated side ‘ the tree has branch’ is the Vyavahara, in the
same way for differentiated side ‘ the pot has curd’ is the vyavahara.
Therefore the example of dual predicates becomes defective. If it is said that
although the example is defective, still it supports one side then this too is
not right. Since just as it is enemy of other side, in the same way it is enemy
of own side also. Possibly the questioner wants to establish that entity and
manifestation are parts of substance but such a substance does not exist, then
how can they be parts.
Example of seed and sprout
is also delusional
389-393. Shloka- This example is also not valid since
the times of seed and sprouts are different after one another. Hence both
cannot be at the same time. The same is not the case with entity and
manifestations which are at the same time.
Just as with the destruction of illumination the lamp also
gets extinguished, both cannot stay without each other. The same applies to
entity and manifestation. Entity is samanya and manifestation is vishesh. Both
cannot stay without each other. Hence both are together at same time and are
inseparable in some aspect.
If it is said that by accepting time difference without
effort it can be established then such means is not right since by accepting
time difference between entity and manifestation, the entity gets destroyed and
non entity gets produced, Hence this
example is also not valid.
Continued...
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