Aapta Pariksha ( Validation of Omniscient )- 2

 

Karika 22-24: (Followers of Shankar sect): Just as worldly people form their bodies from the previous body and the previous body is formed from earlier body endlessly, in the same way it could be accepted for Ishwara also. This would not lead to Anavastha flaw.

(Jains): By accepting this, Ishwara also would becomes like common folks inflicted with karmas transmigrating from one body to another. Thus Ishwara too would be proved to have karmas.

Karika 25-26: (Jains): Hence it is proved that Ishwara does not have body nor does he have any specific dharmas because those exist only in the presence of body. It is also not right to say that he functions like Jineshwara without having desire.

In this manner the beliefs of Naiyayiks etc.  who accept Ishwara as doer of body etc. form worldly activities, are refuted. Now Vaisheshiks say that leave aside the desire, body etc. of Ishwara, we accept the knowledge alone of Ishwara as cause for the worldly activities. What is the flaw there?

(Jains): Tell us whether knowledge of Ishwara is permanent or transitory? Is it all pervasive or non-pervasive? Is it different or indifferent? Whatever you answer, there shall be flaws in the same as follows:

Karika 27 : If the knowledge of  body-less Ishwara is permanent then there should not be a chronological sequence in the events of the world. All the events should have happened in the same instant. It a rule of Nyaya (logic) that in the presence of sufficient reasons the deed  always materializes.   If the cause does not have sequence then how can the effect have a sequence? (the knowledge is always present without sequence so events should happen at the same instant.)

Further there is another flaw that the permanent Gyan cannot be said to be either Praman (cause form) or its result (deed form). Since-

Karika 28-29 : Just as Jains believe the impermanent Samyak Gyan as Praman ( cause) and the subsequent eradication of Agyan is the result (fruition) of the Praman, in the same way if the knowledge of Ishwara is believed to be permanently of the Praman form  then it does not lead to any result (fruition) since no work is done. If the same knowledge is cause as well as its effect then it becomes impermanent which goes against Vaisheshik’s belief. Similarly if the knowledge of Ishwara is said to be only fruition then again it cannot be permanent since it can be accepted as fruition only if it is the result of Praman (cause). And if it is accepted to be result of Praman then it cannot remain permanent. Further if the knowledge is accepted to be fruition without its generation then how can it be called as result? In this manner the permanent knowledge of Ishwara cannot be proved to be either Praman or its fruition. To avoid this flaw if Vaisheshiks accept the knowledge to be impermanent then also it cannot be satisfactory as follows-

Karika 30-31: If the knowledge of Ishwara is believed to be impermanent without a cause ( of the form of Ishwara)  and generated on its own then what is the necessity of accepting Ishwara as cause for generation of other acts also? (If knowledge is generated without Ishwara then other things can also be done.) Or, if that knowledge is said to be generated from another knowledge and that another knowledge from a third knowledge, it leads to flaw of endless connotation without any knowledge being the cause. If to avoid this endless connotation if you accept knowledge to be of eternal form like tree and seed, then Vaisheshiks would also have to accept the presence of eternal karmas, since without accepting a sequence in the cause there cannot be a sequence in the result. With the Ishwara form reason being permanent, there cannot be a sequence. Without the progeny of karmas, there cannot be a cause for the knowledge to be sequential. The progeny of karmas cannot be established without accepting Ishwara with a body. Accepting Ishwara to have a body form makes him non liberated while Ishwara has been accepted to be liberated by Vaisheshiks. In this way there are several flaws in accepting the knowledge of Ishwara as impermanent.

Karika 32-35 : If the knowledge of Ishwara is believed to be non-pervasive and at the same time accepted to be cause for all the events of the universe, then with that knowledge all the events in all the places cannot be accepted, since knowledge within a limited area can be a cause for events in a limited area only, not in all the areas. If you say that knowledge residing in limited area can be cause for all the events of all the areas, then we can say that just as knowledge residing in limited area can be cause for all the events of all the areas, in the same way the knowledge within a limited period can be a cause for all the events of all the times ( which otherwise occur sequentially in time). In other words, if limited area knowledge can be expanded to cover all the acts of the universe, then same logic can be extended to time and limited period knowledge should suffice for all events of all times to be culminated simultaneously.

If to counter the above described flaw, it is said that due to absence of other reasons, all the events do not occur together, then the question arises that in spite of knowledge being there, and due to absence  of other reasons the events do not occur and with the presence of those reasons definitely those events occur, then those reasons only should be accepted to be the reasons for the producing the activities of the universe. Since with the presence of those reasons the events take place and with the absence of those reasons the events do not take place. The knowledge of Ishwara was always present and was never absent. Hence knowledge of Ishwara is inconsequential since even in its presence sometimes the events occur and sometimes it does not occur. On the other hand in the presence of other reasons the events occur and in their absence the events do not occur. Therefore the knowledge of Ishwara residing in limited area cannot be  a cause for the worldly events.

Karika 36 : If the knowledge of Ishwara is believed to be all pervasive and permanent, then also the same logic as described above  can be extended. Such knowledge, like the Ishwara cannot be a reason for the events of the Universe to occur sequentially. In other words all the events of universe of all times should transpire within one moment itself.

Now it is asked that whether the Ishwara knows himself or does not know himself?

Flaw if he does not know himself :

Karika 37- 39: The Naiyayiks and Vaisheshiks believe that knowledge of Ishwara knows all the substances of the universe but does not know himself. Then the doubt arises that if he does not know himself then how can he be called omniscient? One is omniscient only if he knows all the knowables. Therefore it does not establish his omniscient nature.

If you say that Ishwara knows himself by means of another knowledge, therefore he becomes omniscient, then the question arises that if second knowledge enabled him to know self, then how did he know the second knowledge? If you say a third knowledge enabled to know second then again how did he know the third knowledge? In this way it would continue ad infinitum  and finally a knowledge would exist which would not be known to anybody. So it would hinder the establishment of Ishwara as omniscient. Or other wise you have to accept that Ishwara also knows himself.

Vaisheshiks say that there is no harm in accepting that the knowledge is different from Ishwara either.

Flaw if Ishwara knows himself:

Karika 40-42 : (Jains): If the knowledge of Maheshwara is entirely different from Maheshwara then how does one say that the knowledge belongs to Maheshwara or the sky?

(Vaisheshiks): The knowledge of Maheshawara belongs to Maheshwara by means of ‘Samavaya’ relationship. Sky does not have ‘Samavaya’ relationship with knowledge.

(Jains); As per your philosophy the ‘Samavaya’ also is totally different from Maheshwara and the knowledge. Therefore the question arises that why ‘Samavaya’ relationship is between Maheshwara and knowledge? Why not between sky and knowledge?

(Vaisheshiks): Between Maheshwara and knowledge only there is hindrance free relationship and not between sky and knowledge.

(Jains) : If you say that hindrance free relationship is the cause for ‘Samavaya’ relationship then there would be no difference between conjunction and ‘samavaya’ just as it is said that ‘curd is there in the pot’.

(Vaisheshiks): Our objective was to establish that ‘knowledge is there in Maheshwara’. This establishes their relationship.

(Jains): Just relationship is alright but the purpose of ‘Samavaya’ could not be established. In this way the belief of Maheshwara knowing himself with the knowledge being different from him is also not established.  

Karika 43-44 : (Visheshiks): Although ‘Samavaya’ is not established from relationship, even then the substances which are ‘AyutSiddha’, they can have ‘Samavaya’ relation. In this manner Maheshwara and knowledge can have relationship.

(Jains): You are accepting ‘AyutSiddha’ objects as the criterion for ‘Samavaya’ relationship, this is refuted by your own philosophy. ‘AyutSiddha’ are those substances which do not have different support i.e. they are inseparable like milk and water, which is accepted as the worldly definition of ‘AyutSiddha’. But you do not yourself accept milk and water to have ‘Samavaya’ relationship. In your philosophy the threads and the cloth have ‘Samavaya’ relationship and you yourself accept the support for cloth to be its threads and the support for threads to be its constituents. Hence from your own philosophy the ‘Samavaya’ relationship is established between substances having different supports. Therefore they cannot have ‘AyutSiddha’ relationship. If ‘AyutSiddha’ relationship is not there,  they cannot have ‘Samavaya’ relationship. In this way Maheshwara and knowledge are not established to be ‘Ayutsiddha’, hence they cannot have ‘Samavaya’ relationship.

Karika 45-48 : (Vaisheshiks): The characteristics of ‘YutSiddha’ is defined as substances having different support. The Maheshwara is all pervasive hence he does not have any support. The knowledge cannot have any different support. Therefore Maheshwara and knowledge cannot have ‘YutSiddha’ relationship as they do not have different support. Hence they can be accepted to have ‘AyutSiddha’ relationship. 

(jains): If you accept Maheshwara and his knowledge to have AyutSiddha relationship since different supports for them  cannot be  established, then we ask that the sky and soul also are all pervasive hence they do not have different supports, then they should also be treated as ‘AyutSiddha’ and hence should have ‘Samavaya’ ? Now the qualities of dravya etc. also do not have separate support, therefore they cannot be said to be ‘YutSiddha’. Hence being ‘AyutSiddha’ they too  should have ‘Samavaya’ with sky, soul. If they are not treated as ‘AyutSiddha’ then due to absence of ‘Yutsiddha’ and ‘Ayutsiddha’ both, there would be great contradiction.

Karika 49: (Vaisheshiks): In the all pervasive substances like sky, soul etc. the togetherness is experienced hence they can be said to be ‘YutSiddha’.

(Jains): Such togetherness is also experienced even where you accept ‘Ayutsiddha’ such as substance and its qualities, doer-deed, substance and its constituents etc. There too you should accept ‘Yutsiddha’ and hence they cannot have ‘Samavaya’ and instead they would have togetherness.

Karika 50-51 (Jains): In this way since ‘Ayutsiddha’ is not established which was described as  cause for ‘Samavaya’ hence that too cannot be established. Hence that cause cannot be used to differentiate between substances.

Another point which we would like to know is that just as knowledge of Maheshwara has Samavaya relationship with Maheshwara, how does the  samavaya itself attaches to Maheshwara? Is it by means of another ‘Samavaya’? But you have not accepted this and described it as the relationship between substance and its quality. Therefore the cause for establishment of ‘Samavaya’ has been corrupted and due to corrupt logic the ‘Samavaya’ can not be established.

Karika 52-55 (Vaisheshiks): If the substances entering into samavaya are believed to be carried out by another samavaya then that samavaya would need a third samavaya to attach it. In this manner infinite samavayas shall be required resulting in the flaw of infinite connotation. Therefore we accept samavaya to have relationship with substance like that of quality and qualified. In such a case the flaw does not arise.

(Jains): If you accept that in Maheshwara and knowledge, the Samavaya resides with quality and qualified relationship, then we ask that how the quality-qualified relation is retained between its relatives? As per your own logic, the quality-qualified would need another quality-qualified relationship to retain it between the relatives, which would need a third quality-qualified relationship. In this manner the same flaw of infinite connotation is  encountered.

Karika 56: (Vaisheshiks): The anomaly is eliminated by knowing the relationship of quality-qualified by means of quality-qualified knowledge.

(Jains) : Just as  ‘Knowledge in Maheshwara’ has anomaly of support-supported, in the same way the anomaly of support-supported appears here.

Karika 57-59: (Vaisheshiks): The anomaly of infinite connotation can come only when we believe the quality-qualified relationship to be single only and to avoid anomaly we have to imagine several quality-qualified relationships. In reality itself we accept infinite quality-qualified relationships, then how can the anomaly exist? So long as the people desirous of knowing wish, they can imagine the relationship of quality-qualified, and when the desire is satiated then the imagination of quality-qualified also gets quenched. In this manner the anomaly of infinite connotation is not encountered.

(Jains): If you accept infinite relationships of quality-qualified then why do you need ‘samavaya’ and ‘togetherness’ relationships ? Why do you not accept quality-qualified relationships everywhere and believe ‘samavaya’ and ‘togetherness’ as one of their divisions ?

(Vaisheshiks): The ‘Samavaya’ relation is an independent different entity. How can it be a division of quality-qualified relationship ?

(Jains): By believing ‘Samavaya’ as and independent entity, the following flaws are experienced-

Karika 60-62: (Jains): You believe ‘Samavaya’ to be an independent substance, then why do you call it dependent upon its relatives and if you accept it dependent then why do you call it independent? If in spite of ‘Samavaya’ being dependent upon others, you call it independent then nothing shall be dependent.

(Vaisheshiks): In reality the ‘Samavaya’ is an independent substances but the Vyavahara of ‘Samavaya’ is carried out in the presence of relatives hence formally it is accepted as dependent. There is no harm in accepting so.

(Jains): If we accept that in the presence of relatives the ‘Samavaya’ is considered to be dependent in Vyavahara sense then in the same way the Vyavahara of direction etc. pervasive substances is carried out in the presence of corporeal substances, then direction etc. pervasive substances should be treated as dependent. If they are treated as dependent then it contradicts your own philosophy.

If you accept ‘Samavaya’ as absolutely independent then then you cannot make a rule of ‘Samavaya’ with respect to its relatives that this ‘Samavaya’ belongs to these relatives only and not others. To establish relationship of ‘Samavaya’ it should be treated as dependent upon the relatives only.

Karika 63 : (Jains): Further by accepting ‘Samavaya’ as a single substance, the question arises that when ‘Samavaya’ is absolutely  single substance, then why does knowledge remain with Maheshwara only with ‘Samavaya; relationship, and not with sky etc. insentient substances?

Continued…..